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THE ROLE OF THE HORRIBLE IN 
UNDERSTANDING MEDICINE: 
A MEDITATION ON DAVID 
ROTHMAN'S STRANGERS AT THE 
BEDSIDE 
Edward P. Richards, Ill* 
I .  INTRODUCTION 
Unconscious bodies wheezing away on mechanical ventilators, un­
knowing patients injected with cancer cells, unfeeling physicians prolonging 
the death agony of hopelessly premature babies-these are some of the 
horribles that s hape contemporary medical policy. 
These horribles make medicine a uniquely alien world to outsiders 
such as the lawyers, ethicists and other non-medical personnel discussed 
by Professor David Rothman in his excellent book, Strangers at the 
Bedside.• Professor Rothman dares to discuss the underlying politics of 
the bioethics movement, questioning its overall benefit to patients. In this 
essay I test the proposition that the bioethics movement has, on balance, 
contributed to a decline in patient autonomy. 
I do not suggest that bioethicists have acted improperly or dishon­
orably. Nor do I suggest that physicians, left on their own, will always 
protect their patients' interests. My thesis is that the h orrible facts of 
medical practice, combined with its scientific basis, lead outsiders into 
misunderstandings that ultimately harm patients. To make my bias clear, 
I write as a quasi-insider. I am a law professor and lawyer, but I am 
trained in medical science and research. I am periodically involved in 
scientific research2 and routinely involved in medical decision-making. I 
write extensively for physicians and biomedical engineers. 
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law. B.A. , Rice 
University; J.D., University of Houston Law Center; M.P. H., University of Texas School of Public 
Health. The author would like 10 thank Professor Nancy Levit, Dr. J. Alexander Gold and Dr. 
Charles Walter for their ideas and discussions which lead to this article. 
I. DAVID J.  ROTHMAN, M.D., STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE (1991) (hereinafter ROTHMAN). 
2. Arnold Miller et al., Birth Clustering, 1990 PROC. OF THE AM. STAT. Soc'Y, (forthcoming 
1992); Barry B. Bounds & Edward P. Richards III, Using Objects to Communicate Legal Information, 
COMPUTER Soc'Y PRESS OF THE IEEE, 9 PHO ENIX CONF. ON COMPUTERS AND COMM. 766-771 (1990); 
Arnold R. Miller & Edward P. Richards I II, Statistical Analysis of Medical Malpractice Costs: 
Analysis of Incident Reporting Times, PROC . OF THE Bus. AND EcoN. STAT. SEc. OF AM. STAT. 
Soc'Y, 327 (1 989); R. R. Sharp, III & Edward P. Richards Ill, Molecular Mobilities of Soluble 
Components in the Aqueous Phase of Bovine Chroma/fin Granules, 491 810CHIMICA AND 810PHYSICA 
ACTA 260 (1977); R. R. Sharp, III & Edward P. Richards III, Analysis of the Carbon JJ and Proton 
NMR Spectra of Bovine Chroma/fin Granules, 497 BIOCHIMICA AND BtoPH�SICA AcTA 14 (1977); R. 
R. Sharp III & Edward P. Richards Ill, NMR Evidence for an Acetylcholme ATP Complex, 64, #3 
BIOCHEMICAL AND BIOPHYSICAL RES. COMM. BS I ( 1975). 
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I believe that most bioethicists have been distracted by horrible facts, 
allowing themselves to be blinded to the profound ethical implications
. 
of 
the organizational and financial shifts that are fundamentally changing 
the physician-patient relationship.3 While ethicists are increasingly con­
cerned with rationing medical care and the perverse impact of third-party 
payors providing incentives to physicians who provide less care to their 
patients, this concern comes many years too late. 
The 1970s saw medicine become a capital intensive business. The 
1980s saw competition and entrepreneurship become watchwords for med­
ical practice. During the same period, legal academics and bioethicists 
focused on topics such as informed consent and right to die. These are 
important issues, but their true significance is as symptoms of the struc­
tural changes in medical practice. Focusing on these surface issues inad­
vertently provided ethical cover for third-party payors and governmental 
entities• that use issues such as right to die to manipulate public opinion 
regarding access to care for the elderly and the seriously ill.� 
This essay begins with the genesis of Professor Rothman's book. I 
then explore why medicine is an alien culture to non-physicians. While 
this essay is not meant to be a comprehensive review of Strangers at the 
Bedside, I do track Professor Rothman's presentation of different ex­
amples of bioethical reforms, extending his historical analysis with a 
discussion of how these reforms are co-opted by the marketplace. This 
discussion centers on how patient empowerment has failed as an effective 
philosophy for assuring ethical decision-making. I conclude with sugges­
tions for rethinking the role of ethicists and other strangers at the bedside. 
II. THE ORIGIN OF STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE 
Professor Rothman is a narrative historian who writes on contem­
porary medical topics. He is an excellent scholar who is not reluctant to 
advocate his views of right and wrong.6 Strangers at the Bedside grew 
out of an invitation by the Columbia School of Medicine to have Professor 
. 
3· 
_
Ironically, traditional physician-dominated ethical codes were concerned with the financial conflicts mh"ent in practicing medicine: "What a far cry from the days when medical 'ethics' consisted of condemning ec · · · · onom1c 1mpropnettes such as fee splitting and advertising " ROTHMAN, s11pra note I, at 200. · 
4 
· For example, the Oregon Plan for health care rationing has been favorably received in ;uch of the media, despite its fundamental unfairness to poor women and children. See David J. Othman, Rot10111ng .Uft, 39 IS New You Review OF Books, Mar. S, 1992, at 32. S. Many phys1c1ans arc deeply suspicious of ethicists· In a brief period the prof · 1 h" · · h .'. . essiona et 1c1st has become a fixture on the medical scene. At t
R 
c mo�_cnt ethicist is a self-descriptive term, and any entrepreneur can claim the title. e mem.,.,r that the authority and soc· 1 . ia acceptance of phrenologists in the early nineteenth �m•ury WU such that the faculty of a r A . of 1 departmenr f h 1 
amous mencan university discussed the establishment 
Wh h 
0 P reno ogy • and eventually rejected it by a margin of only one vote. atevcr t e competence of ethic' t be on the sider 
is s as a group, physicians must not allow themselves to 
<�or1c A. Silver, E���;is�� i:
a
�:�c��:'. 
��8cc�l:
N
��cc:3t�ei;
1
��;ions with patients. 
6. David J. Ro1hman MD Doe • u 
• 
· 
al H. 
' · 
·
• sn 1 mean More Deaths', N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1991, § I, 
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Rothman join their ranks. 7 This invitation allowed Professor Rothman to. 
become deeply involved in the process of delivering medical care and 
performing medical research. The resulting book is deeply skeptical of 
many aspects of established medicine. It also reflects, h owever, some of 
the complexity of medical practice and is perhaps equally skeptical of the 
simplistic solutions being proposed for reforming the medical care system. 
Strangers at the Bedside is subtitled, "A history of how law and 
bioethics transformed medical decisionmaking." This theme is developed 
through an analysis of three areas: 1)  medical experimentation; 2) refusing 
care for severely impaired newborns; and 3) terminating lif esupport and 
substituted decisionmaking for the terminally ill. The common thread in 
each example is a highly publicized horror story that p recipitates a 
legislative or judicial revision o f  existing practices. In every case, the 
physician's power was reduced and third parties to the physician-patient 
relationship gained a right to intervene in the decision-making. Patients 
gained real power in some cases, theoretical power in others and lost 
power in a few. 
Professor Rothman humanizes the physicians involved in some of 
these horrible situations by recognizing that there are alternative perspec­
tives that make otherwise brutal behavior explicable. 8 In doing so, he 
steps into dangerous territory. The great power of the horrible anecdote 
as a rhetorical device is the ease with which persons who attempt to 
mitigate, the horror are painted as  condoning the behavior in question. 
Medical care and research is fraught with horrible situations and competing 
interests. Recognizing competing interests, even accepting that the com­
peting interests are compelling, is not the same as denying the horror of 
the situation. 9 
III. THE TWO CULTURES PROBLEM 
For those who work with medical policy issues, Professor Rothman's 
discussion of his socialization into the medical school culture may be the 
most fascinating part of his book.10 Medicine is an alien culture for non­
physicians. 11 The most difficult p roblem for outsiders working in alien 
cultures is achieving a proper balance between gaining enough knowledge 
and empathy to accurately portray the culture, and going native.12 
In general, science-based cultures are fundamentally alien to persons 
without scientific training. C. P. Snow called this the "two cultures" 
7. ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 5. 
8. ROTHMAN, supra note l, at 218. 
9. Laurie Zoloth-Dorfman & Bridget Carney, The AIDS Patient and the last ICU Bed: 
Scarcity, Medical Futility, and Ethics, 17 QRB 175-81 (1991). 
10. ROTHMAN, supra note I, at 135, see text surrounding note. 
11. While not meant to denigrate the knowledge and understanding o f  the nursing profession, 
the primary legal relationship is between physician and patient. This is based on the physician's sole 
authority to make medical decisions as defined in most state licensing acts. 
12. Going native, in the context of writing about medicine, usually means an uncritical 
acceptance of the norms of the particular medical group studied. In the case of physicians and 
scientists turned ethicists and philosophers, however, it frequently means a wholesale rejection of 
scientific values in favor of vaguely spiritual "individual centered" philosophies. 
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problem; 13 the difficulty of communication .between pers��s enculturated in the sciences or engineering and persons m the humamt1es. The blame 
for this failure to communicate rests on both cultures. 
Scientific disciplines, medicine in particular, train and reward for 
narrow technological expertise. 14 With the demise of traditional liberal 
education in the universities, many of these practitioners have focused on 
the sciences since the beginning of high school. This focus is often _to the 
exclusion of other life activities . essential to emotional maturity and 
understanding of the human condition. is Scientific and technical training 
also inculcates a belief in knowledge and progress as unalloyed goods, 
irrespective of their impact on society .16 
In turn, persons with only humanities training are often profoundly 
illiterate in the maths and sciences.17 This illiteracy impedes their reading 
and evaluating primary scientific material. Scholars who confine them­
selves to secondary sources, such as journalist popularizations, 18 lay­
oriented simplifications19 and articles that themselves are base'tl only on 
secondary sources, are handicapped in their appreciation of the complexity 
and nuances of scientific and medical problems. This may manifest as 
either romantic, superficial generalizations o f  scientific ideas, or as a 
lumping together of well-reasoned research and National Inquirer hysteria­
mongering. 20 
13. c. P. SNOW, THE Two CULTURES AND THE SctENTIFIC REVOLUTION (1959). 
14. J. Allan Hobson, Symposium, Psyc hiatry as Scientific Humanism: A Program Inspired by 
Ro�rto Unger's Passion, 81 Nw.U.L.REv. 791 (1987). 
IS. The image of lhe callous physician, locked in perpetual adolescence, is a perennial literary 
Iheme. W. Somerset Maugham, who was qualified as a surgeon, wrote an early classic, Of Human 
Bondage (1915). A more contemporary view can be found in SAMUEL SHEM, HousE OF Goo (1978). 
16. In lb�n's Enemy of the People, we sec a physician crushed by the discovery that his fellow 
citizens would rather not know that the spa that provided the economic base for their town was 
conraminated by dangerous bacteria. 
17. This, of course, only applies to !hose who shun the sciences in rheir formal education. 
Even those withoul formal scientific training, given an interest in a scientific area, may systematically 
educate t hemsclves if they arc willing to invest the time to learn the necessary background materials. 
Such self-education is different, however, from the superficial glibness that lawyers are taught to 
develop 10 advocate a clienr's narrow inlerests in a specific case. The lawyer's task is to appear 
convincing to a jury or judge, not to understand the complexities of a discipline. In some ways, the 
lawyer who _is ignoran1 of the discipline is at an advantage. A lawyer skilled in the underlying area 
must put aside the complexities and ambiguities to be an effective advocate· and must sometimes 
even wr�stle the _cthi�al q�estion of when oversimplification becomes fraud. L�wycrs who only know 
superficial o�cr
_
s1mphficau�n� �re less often chafed by the ethics of dissembling. 
18. This is not to d_im1msh the value of such popularizations. As an example, James Gleick's 
book. Chaos (1.987), provided an excellent, though simplified, introduction 10 the particular problem 
posed by non·hn
_
ear systems such as wealher forecasting. This provided a gateway inlo the primary 
\ources for mdav1du�ls who had not k nown of lhc chaos theory, but were willing to investigate these 
�our.:es. It 15 _1he pnmary sources, however, that present both the complexity and the limitations of 
the theory. l·or cumplc Gl·1·ck al 79 d. h h . . . • ' , ISCusses ow c aos theory can help to understand the d�na
_
m1.:\ of cp1dcm1cs such as AIDS. The primary sources, such as Heben w. Hethcote & James 
A_. 't or�e. Gonorrhea Transmission Dynamics and Control, in LECTURE NOTES IN BIOMATHEMATICS 
(S. l.evm e_d. 1984) _ illustrate tha� while epidemiological systems are non·linear, chaos theory only 
plays a li mited role an understanding r he ir dynamics. 
. I�. This g_
cnera is typified by Scientific American. While skillfully wrirten, these articles often 
111nort• m.:onvc�1cn1 fac1s lhal gel in lhe way of the flow of rhe story. 
20. Tim is, of course, not limited to non-scienlists. Both scientists and non-scientists were 
rcprcm11cd in 1hc proliferation of articles and theories 10 explain crop circles. 
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Of all the science-based systems, medicine is at once the most familiar 
and the most alien. It is the most familiar because its concerns are those 
of every person: life, death, and, most importantly, health. The notions 
of healing, the province of medicine,21 are embedded in every culture. 
Even in the United States, the world leader in high technology medical 
care, 22 a substantial part of the population relies on non-scientific23 and 
lay healers. 24 The persistence of these healers testifies to both the enduring 
belief that healing is a natural activity that does not require university 
training and the real limitations in medical treatment. 
Medicine is the most alien of sciences for three reasons. First, it 
demands objectivity in the face of human suffering. Objectivity is difficult 
in all disciplines.25 Pure objectivity, the ability to judge facts on their 
own, without reference to outside, non-factual considerations, is impos­
sible. Objectivity is most difficult in medicine because of the unavoidable 
identification of physicians, as fellow humans, with their patients. Finan­
cial and emotional considerations26 make even relative objectivity difficult 
in medicine. These considerations delay acceptance of new knowledge by 
established physicians27 and encourage other physicians to be overly eager 
to adopt unproven ideas.28 
Second, medicine is a relatively young discipline. We see an enormous 
medical research establishment and forget that while scientific medicine 
may have its roots in Paracelsus's studies of pharmacology,29 it did not 
2 1. The late Ruel Stallones, M.D., M.P.H., founding Dean of University of Texas School of 
Public Health, was always careful to talk about medical care and medical care delivery. He believed 
that it was critical for medical policymakers to understand thal we do not care for health, nor do 
we deliver health. We care for disease and we deliver disease care. 
22. High technology in medical care is not limited to the use of machines on patients. The 
most pervasive use of technology is pharmaceuticals, which now account for approxima1ely ISOJo of 
the medical care dollar. 
23. Chiropractors are the most numerous and powerful of these practitioners. 
24. Many of these people reject physician care for non-financial reasons. In some parts of the 
south, the lay midwife (midwives with no formal medical training, as distinguished from nurse 
midwives) movement is religiously-based and is targeted toward middle class suburban women. 
25. The relevant comparison in law is not with jurisprudential theories, but with the management 
of conflicts of interest. The diffusion of alternative dispute resolution and preventive law into 
traditional litigation-oriented law practice and teaching is a good parallel with the problems of 
paradigm shift in science. 
26. The human genome project is a good example. Every scientist involved in the project has 
a substantial financial interest in its progress. Even the usual interests of university researchers in 
federal grant money is now complicated by their simultaneous holding in private genetic technology 
concerns. 
27. The classic work is THOMAS s. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 
1972). The relevant point is that scientists' reputations and personal psychologies become dependant 
on the validity of the theories with which they are identified. This undermines their willingness to 
accept new scientific knowledge. 
28. Two dangerous manifestations of this are the rush by physicians to be "first on the block" 
with trendy new therapies and the willingness of "alternative healers" to promote quasi-mystical 
nonsense. 
29. Paracelsus (1493- 1541) broke away from the Galenic tradition and used empirical studies 
to determine the effects of drugs. 
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begin to flower until the work of Pasteur30 and Semmelweis31 in !he later 
part of the 1880s. It was not until sometime. after l�. that gomg �o a physician increased a patient's chances of survival. Med1cme as a hospi�al­
based, capital intensive business, epitomized by the research medical 
center, is a product of the 1950s and 1960s. . The values that shape the contemporary physician-patient relationship 
were formed before medicine had effective treatments. The great historical 
tradition of medicine is, at best, one of dedicated emotional support for 
patients. At worst, it is a history of fraud and deception. Physicians are 
expected to practice a discipline that has changed fundamentally during 
one practice lifetime. It is not surprising that traditional medical values 
have failed to provide clear guidance for solving the problems of modern 
medical practice. 
Third, and most critical, physicians must deal with horrible facts. 
The scientific details seem the most difficult barriers for non-scientists 
seeking to understand medical practice. Yet medical practice is just as 
difficult to understand for persons skilled in other branches of the life 
sciences, for whom the science of medicine is perfectly comprehensible. 
What is most alienating for both groups is that the objective facts of 
much of medical practice are horrifying. The process of surgery is the 
cold-blooded rending of flesh and tearing of organs. Chemotherapy is the 
systematic poisoning of the patient in hopes of killing the tumor faster 
than the patient. The management of chronic diseases such as renal failure, 
AIDS and other HIV-related diseases, diabetes, congestive heart failure, 
and untold others, is not one of cure, but of slowing and mitigating 
death. 
Appreciating and accommodating this horror is a major part of the 
training of physicians and, as Professor Rothman found, those who would 
understand the complexities of medical ethics. Medical training is often 
criticized for its inhumanity.32 It is questionable, however, how humane 
medical training can be and still prepare physicians to deal with inhumane 
situations. This is not a question of becoming "hardened" to human 
30. Pasteur's work on the biological origin of disease was the foundation of modern medical 
science. Interestingly, Pasteur's work was widely accepted precisely because he was a chemist with 
strong political supporters outside of organized medicine. 
31. Semmelweis was the first to use statistical analysis when he studied the incidence and cause 
of childbed fever. Unlike Pasteur, he was a physician and thus subject to the sanctions of the medical 
profession. While he was able to reduce the mortality of the disease from I20Jo to 1.5% of pregnant 
w�men, his work was ignored and he was driven from practice in Vienna. His sin was to show that 
chi
.
ldbed fever was an iatrogenic illness, spread by the very physicians from whom the women sought 
relief. 
32. Some of these criticisms are well taken. John M. Colford, Jr., M.D., & Stephen J. McPhee, 
M.D., The Ravelled Sleeve of Care; Managing the Stresses of Residency Training, 261 JAMA(R) 889-93 (1989). The best founded of these objections is to the long hours demanded in many training 
programs. Alan D. Dedrick, M.D., The Eighty-Hour Workweek; Residency Friend or Foe? 144 AM. 
J · �JS. CHILD. 857 (1990). These take an unacceptable toll on both the physicians and the patients. 
David A. Asch, M.D., & Ruth M. Parker, M.D., The Libby Zion Case: One Step Forward or Two 
Steps ��ckward? 318 .
NEw ENG. J. MED. 771-75 (1988); Kenneth E. Thorpe, Ph.D., House Staff 
Super\l/s1on and Workmg Hours; Implications of Regulatory Change in New York State 263 JAMA(R) 
3177-81 (1990). 
' 
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suffering, although a certain degree of detachment is fundamental to a 
physician's emotional survival. Physicians, and those who would under­
stand medical practice, must learn not to let the horror of individual 
suffering blind them to the best medical decision-making for that individ­
ual. 
This is best understood in the context where physicians themselves 
recognize that they are unable to be sufficiently objective. It is considered 
bad practice, if not unethical, for physicians to treat members of their 
own families. Traditionally, physicians have treated their colleagues' fam­
ilies without charge to discourage the physicians from treating their own 
families. 33 Termed professional courtesy, this practice recognizes that 
objective decision-making is impossible when the physician is emotionally 
involved with the patient. Contrary to the usual assumption that patients 
would get better medical care if physicians only cared more about them, 
caring a lot about patients as individuals is very destructive to the patient's 
medical care. When a physician cares deeply about an individual, that 
physician is torn between undertreatment because of denial and overtreat­
ment because of fear. 
A. Do Horrible Facts Make Physicians into Strangers? 
Professor Rothman addresses the role of horrible facts in his chapter 
entitled ''The Doctor as Stranger.'' The most powerful paragraph in this 
chapter, and, in my view, one of the most insightful in the literature of 
cross-discipline studies of medical practice, deals with Professor Rothman's 
internalization of the significance of horror in isolating physicians from 
society: 
Physicians' shoptalk is not so much boring as it is filled with tales that 
would strike outsiders as tragic and gruesome, stories that no one else 
would want to hear around a dinner table, or for that matter, anywhere 
else. Let one personal experience clarify the point. No sooner did I join 
a medical school faculty than I met with the chairman and chief of 
service of v arious clinical departments (pediatrics, medicine, and so on) 
to explore what interest each department might have in social medicine. 
The sessions were informal, but much of these first conversations turned 
on "interesting cases," which typically involved descriptions of devastating 
illness. . . . At first I thought these stories were an initiation ritual -
was a historian trained to do archival work up to the stuff of medicine? 
But I slowly learned that this was not a right of passage but a sharing 
of anecdotes and gossip; they assumed that because I was part of the 
faculty, I, too, would be fascinated by the shoptalk. Then, in turn, when 
friends asked about these meetings, I would share the stories; but as I 
watched their faces get tense and drawn, I learned to put aside the 
question and change the subject. The substance of m edicine, I was 
learning, was easiest talked about with med�cal pe�ple, �o t  bec�use of 
its technical or dry qualities, but because of its scarmess m exposmg the 
frailty of human beings and the dimensions of suffering. 34 
33. Richard c. Wasserman, M.D., et al, Health Care of Physicians' Children, 83 PEDIATRICS 
319-22 (1989). 
34. ROTHMAN, supra note l, at 135. 
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This description of Professor Rothman's internalization of the 
significance of horrible facts is doubly compelling. First, Professor Ro�hman 
was not unfamiliar with horrible facts in related contexts. In particular, 
his studies of asylums for the mentally ill forced him to confront suffering 
and helplessness in the face of disease.JS Yet the horrors of his resear�h 
into asylums did not prepare him for the pervasive impact of horror m 
the routine practice of medicine. While not discussed by Professor Rothman, 
it is possible that a key difference between his approach to his asylum 
research and his initiation into medical culture was an assumption that 
the conditions in asylums were improper and should be fixed. 
One can imagine one's non-medical friends (or oneselO earnestly 
discussing the horrors of asylums in the way that persons discuss problems 
in society that can be fixed, even if they are not being fixed; "If people 
were just more dedicated, if we would just spend more money, if we 
would just listen to the experts ..  " Such caring, but detached, discussion 
is possible because the problems seem tractable, at least theoretically. 
Most importantly, the problems of asylums are not deeply disquieting 
because they are other people's problems; few people see themselves as 
potential inmates in asylums. The horrors of medical practice cannot be 
escaped because they are the horrors of life itself. 
Professor Rothman's account is also compelling because he articulates 
how this initiation separated him from non-physicians. His realization of 
the effects of his stories on his non-medical colleagues is a profound 
insight for those, enculturated into the medical ethos, who would bridge 
the gap between medical and non-medical worlds. Professor Rothman 
uses this insight as part of  his persuasive picture of the physician as a 
stranger to society. 36 He leaves unanswered the question as to the extent 
that this is a societally-imposed, as well as self-imposed, separation. 
Professor Rothman's personal solution was to change the subject, 
rather than to discuss difficult medical cases with his non-physician 
colleagues. This raises the critical question: was this a decision on Professor 
Rothman's part to avoid a discussion which made him uncomfortable,37 
or d
.
oes it reflect his realization that he would be ostracized by his non­
mcd1cal colleagues if he continued with his tales of horror? 
I cannot answer this question for Professor Rothman's colleagues. I 
find most persons without medical training profoundly uncomfortable 
when confronted with specific, graphic discussions of medical facts. Many 
H · The overcrowding was desperate - beds jammed one nex1 10 the other in the 
""<lrd, and along the hallways - and the fihh ubiquitous, so that virulent intestinal diseases 
hkc 'h11clla 'Prcad through the population. Staffing was minimal one attendant to fifty 
or "''Y inmarcs and ini·urics co · h 'd · 
' 
· 
· mmon, wit res1 ents abusing themselves or assaulting 
or hen. 
l>HIO j ROTHMAN .t SHEi' • M R T • .,. . OTHMAN, HE WILLOWBROOK W.us, at 15 (1984). 
. 
36· Th" exiends lo the cs1ran1cmcn1 of many physicians from rheir families and given their "immun11)· 'landing and weahh rheir I 1· 1 k f · 
' 
• re a 1vc ac o involvement in politics ROTHMAN supra note 
I. al I 3.1-.17. 
' ' 
J7. A dC\:i�ion which was available beca · 'd · 
· 
. use as an ms1 er/ou1s1der he could move on to his oul\ld<'r in1cre\U. ' 
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law students have difficulty in dealing with realistic discussions of the 
medical facts in torts cases. More troubling are medical law and policy 
experts who are emotionally unprepared to face the detailed factual 
analysis that is necessary to understand certain difficult medical problems. 38 
This is not limited to squeamishness over unpleasant physiological 
phenomena. It extends to an unwillingness to confront situations where 
ethically proper decisions conflict with generally accepted notions of 
individual liberty. 39 
This unwillingness to face horrible facts often manifests as a 
schizophrenic combination of vilification and sentimentalization of medical 
issues. It also leads outsiders to fixate on issues that pose fascinating 
ethical questions, but have de minimus impact on medical practice. As 
discussed later, this becomes destructive when general medical policy is 
determined by these aberrant anecdotes. 
B. The Importance of Shared Knowledge 
Professor Rothman was struck by the use of case-based, or, as he 
puts it, "case-by-case" reasoning in clinical decision-making. 40 He sees 
this as resolving cases without rules and believes that persons with a legal 
mind-set are much more likely t o  "search for the rule that should be 
imposed on a particular case than to see how the case can be resolved 
without it. "41 He is troubled because he sees this case-based reasoning 
used to avoid general ethical rules by finding exceptions that undermine 
the proposed rule: 
Physicians, as I have learned, frequently bring this case-by-case approach 
into the consideration of social and ethical issues. Offer them a principle 
to consider (for example, that patients have the right to know their 
diagnosis), and they will often come up with a case (drawn from 
experience42) that they believe undercuts and thereby negates the principle 
(for instance, the seeming inappropriateness of informing a seventy-five­
year-old woman about to go o ff to her grandchild's wedding that she 
has an inoperable and slow-growing brain tumor). Describe a case in the 
ethics of decision making at t he end of life that occurred at another 
hospital, and the physicians will initially try to obviate the problem by 
claiming that those doctors made egregious errors in their treatment (for 
example, this patient should never have needed a respirator in the first 
place). It is as though their ability to resolve the incident at hand absolves 
them of the need to formulate or respect general principles. If they can 
38. Feeling revulsion does not, in itself, discredit a scholar's work . There are subjects, such as 
the Nazi concentration camp medical experiments, that properly horrify all who study them. Horror 
of the subject of inquiry is only relevant when it distorts the scholarship. One must attempt to 
understand the rational behavior behind even horrible acts such as the Nazi death camps. 
39 . RAEL J. ISAAC & VmoINIA c. AllMAT, MADNESS IN mE STREETS (1990). 
40. "Perhaps the most remarkable feature of clinical decision making is the extraordinary 
reliance on a case-by-case approach." ROTHMAN, supra note I, at 7. 
41. ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 8. 
42. What many outsiders do not realize is that physicians use medical hypotheticals just as Jaw 
professor's use legal hypotheticals . It matters  Jess that . 
the counter-example be �e�I � that it co.uld 
be real. Jn many cases, clinical hypotheticals are composites, drawn from the phys1c1an s own practice, 
the practice of colleagues, and the general medical mythology . 
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cite a case in which the proposed rule does not hold, then they have 
ostensively discredited not only the rule, but the search for rules. In 
short, clinicians start with the case at hand, and if they have their way, 
stop with the case at hand.43 
Medicine does use case-by-case reasoning. There is an old joke, 
however, that whenever a physician begins a sentence with "in my clinical 
experience," you should be prepared for a statement that contradicts 
common-sense, if not physical law. Outsiders often misunderstand this 
process, however, because they do not appreciate physicians' shared 
background. No other graduate and post-graduate education is so consistent 
between schools. This is due to comprehensive accreditation requirements 
and to a shared belief in what a physician should know. While not all 
medical schools have the same curriculum, and many medical educators 
disagree on what medical education should be, these differences are 
insignificant compared to the tumult in disciplines such as law. 
As an example, my greatest surprise in moving into law teaching was 
that there were no requirements on the content of required courses. As 
long as your course has the proper title, no one inquires into what you 
teach. I soon had the second surprise of finding that law school accreditation 
requirements make minimal demands on what courses must be required, 
irrespective of their content. This combination of idiosyncratic course 
content, and limited accreditation requirements on required courses, allows 
students from the same law school to graduate with little shared knowledge. 
This is exacerbated when comparing the shared knowledge of students 
from different law schools.44 
There are pedagogic reasons why a lock-step curriculum is not desirable 
in law45 (and history, sociology, etc.). This does not obviate the cultural 
gulf between persons educated under such broad disciplines and physicians. 
When an outsider sees physicians making what appear to be ad hoc, case­
by-case decisions, the reality is often profoundly different. Medical students 
and residents are as rule-oriented as law or philosophy students. The cases 
they discuss are often exceptions to an unarticulated rule unknown to the 
outsider, or are surrogates for complex rules in a shorthand discussion of 
which theory should govern the patient's care. 46 This is especially likely 
43. ROTHMAN, supra note I, at 7. 
44. It might be expected that the bar examinations would force a great degree of homogeneity 
on law school teaching. This does not happen, however, because in each state a private company 
runs a comprehensive, lengthy bar review cram course to give all students the minimal knowledge 
necessary to pass the state's bar examination. Given the limited focus of the bar examinations, it is 
an open question whether the average law school admittee could do equally well on the bar examination 
by skipping law school and taking the bar review course. 
45. Most important is that law is not a well-defined subject, changing from state to state and 
fro
.
m case to case. Law students are taught to analyze problems and to look up the relevant law. 
This assumes that the lawyer has the time to investigate the facts and do detailed research on the 
law: Phy�icians are �eldom able to make decisions at such a leisurely pace. Edward P. Richards, 
Lmng with Uncertainty: lnfor,mation Theory and Clinical Decision Making, s J. INTENSIVE CARE 
MED. 91 (1990) . 
. 46. There is an�ther old joke �n
. 
�he mystery created by shared background: A sociologist visits 
a prison warden to discuss the poss1b1hty of doing research in the prison. The warden takes her on 
1992) STRANGERS A T  THE BEDSIDE 739 
when the outsider only sees the "interesting cases;" those brought to the 
attention of ethics committees, those used as teaching m aterial, or just 
those that are unusual enough that they are discussed around the department 
coffee pot. 
V. MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION 
No area of bioethical inquiry is more thoroughly grounded in horrible 
facts than is medical research. Modern bioethics, as it concerns medical 
experimentation, 47 begins with the Nuremberg trials and the resulting 
Nuremberg Code. 48 Of all the atrocities of the Nazi concentration camps, 
perhaps the most disturbing were the medical experiments. This was not 
due to their brutality alone, for in the context of the death camps, relative 
brutality is meaningless. The medical experiments were abhorrent because 
they were performed by physicians, mocking the expected dedication of 
physicians to their patients' well-being.49 
The Nuremberg Code arose from the trial of Karl Brandt. It was 
intended to be a code of ethics governing human experimentation, but its 
emphasis on patient autonomy was the first major break from the pater­
nalistic model for the physician-patient relationship.50 It was generally 
ignored, however, 51 because most p hysicians saw the Nuremberg Code as 
irrelevant to their practices: the acts of monsters such as Dr. Mengele 
a tour of the cell-block. As they pass the cells, they hear a prisoner call out "47!". This is immediately 
followed by guffaws of laughter. Soon another prisoner calls out "53", which is also followed by 
laughter. The sociologist, baffled, asked the warden what was going on. He replied that the prisoners 
all knew the same jokes, so they had numbered them to make it easier to tell them in the confusion 
of the cellblock. Calling out the number was telling the joke. (The joke continues that the sociologist 
calls out a number and is greeted by silence. The warden explains that the humor is all in the 
delivery.) 
47. For a broad investigation of human experimentation, including social science research, see 
JAY KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN B EINGS (1972). 
48. Nuremberg Code, 2 TRIALS OF WAR. CR.WrnALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MnrrAR.Y TRIBUNALS 
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 181-82 (1949) reprinted in ROBERT J. LEVrNE, ETHICS AND 
REGULATION OF CLrNICAL RESEARCH 425 (1981). 
49. Less well known, but perhaps more disquieting, physicians were well represented in the SS 
itself. In general, see ROBERT J. LIFTON, THE NAZI DocTORS: MEDICAL KnLINO AND THE PSYCHOLOGY 
OF GENOCIDE (1986). 
SO. a. T h e  voluntary consent of the human subject is abso lutely essential. 
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent: should be 
so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice without the intervention of any 
element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, overreaching, or other ulterior form of constraint 
or coercion and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of 
the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened 
decision. This latter element requires that before the acceptance of an affirmative decision 
by the experimental subject there should be made known to him the nature, duration, and 
purpose of the experiment; the method and means by which it is to be co�ducted; all 
inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the effects upon his health or 
person which may possibly come from his participation in the experiment. 
Nuremberg Code, 2 TRIALS OF WAR CIUMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MnrrARY TRIBUNALS UNDER 
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 181-82 (1949) reprinted in ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND 
REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 425 (1981). 
s 1. For a fascinating history of the Nuremberg Code and legal deci�ion� on medical 
experimentation both pre-Code and post-Code, see George J. Annas, Mengele s Birthmark: The 
Nuremberg Code in United States Courts, 7 J .  CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & Pot'Y 17 (1991). 
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were too far removed from clinical research in the United States . 52 
Ironically, the horror of the Nazi death camp experiments was so great 
that physicians distanced themselves from it in the same way that non­
physicians distance themselves from the horrors of routine medical prac­
tice. It was more than fifteen years after the promulgation of the Nurem­
berg Code before the ethics of medical research in the United States was 
seriously questioned. 
Professor Rothman begins his discussion of medical research with the 
end of the "golden age" - the publication of Ethics and Clinical Research 
in 1966.53 In this article, Professor Beecher discussed twenty-two examples 
of unethical conduct by medical researchers . 54 The conduct decried by 
Beecher was described by the scientists themselves in their articles and 
was approved by the peer-reviewers who approved the articles for publi­
cation. All the studies were performed after the promulgation of the 
Nuremberg Code and would have been difficult or impossible to perform 
if the provisions of the Code had been followed. 
The unethical conduct complained of in most of these experiments 
was a failure to obtain a proper consent from the patients who partici­
pated. This was not a mere formality. A number of the experiments posed 
substantial risks to the patients. In some cases, the risks were such as to 
make the experiment ethically questionable, irrespective of patient con­
sent . 55 Beecher makes clear, however, that the unethical conduct in most 
of these experiments was the result of "thoughtlessness and carelessness, 
not wilful disregard for the patient's rights . . . . "56 
52. It is not a fictional villain but a flesh-and-blood murderer, Josef Mengele, who sets the 
modern standard for experimentation atrocities. By almost any measurement, Mengele, the "Angel 
of Death," was one of the most notorious of the Nazi physicians. Eyewitness accounts summarize 
the cold brutality and murder of this M.D .-Ph.D. "man of science." Some of his most horrifying 
work involved genetically-related experiments performed on children who were twins, many of whom 
he personally murdered. In an affidavit, one of his prison assistants, Dr. Miklos Nyiszli, describes 
h"w Mengele once killed fourteen Gypsy twins himself: 
Id. 
In the work room next to the dissecting room, fourteen Gypsy twins were waiting and 
crying bitterly. Dr. Mengele didn't say a single word to us, and prepared a IO cc and a 5 
cc syringe. From a box he took Evipal and from another box he took chloroform, which 
was in 20 cc glass containers, and put these on the operating table. After that the first 
twin was brought in . . .  a fourteen year old girl. Dr. Mengele ordered me to undress the 
girl and put her head on the dissecting table. Then he injected the Evipal into her right 
arm intravenously. After the child had fallen asleep, he felt for the left ventricle of the 
heart and injected 10 cc of chloroform. After one little twitch the child was dead, whereupon 
Dr. Mengele had her taken into the corpse chamber. In this manner all fourteen twins 
were killed during the night. 
53. Henry K. Beecher , Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1 354 (1966). 54. Id. at 1355-59. 
5� . W�il
.
e �ach of the experiments posed a substantial risk to the patients involved, there were few serious 1�1uries. In only one case was there clear evidence that the experiment caused the death of
.
an otherwise healthy person. In this experiment, a malignant melanoma (a fast growing and deadly skm �ancer) was transplanted into a healthy volunteer. The callus disregard for the patient in this experiment approached the level of that displayed in some of the Nazi experiments. Id. at 1359. 56. Id. at 1356. 
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Having started with Beecher's 1 966 article, Professor Rothman jumps 
back to turn of the century and presents an excellent history of medical 
research in the United States. 57 He reviews the development of medical 
research in the United States. The purpose of this review is to demonstrate 
the development of the arrogance and self-assurance of the medical 
research community that led to the thoughtlessness and carelessness ob­
served by Beecher. 
Professor Rothman successfully conveys the development of the mind­
set that puts research progress ahead of patient well-being. He then 
demonstrates how abusive medical experiments were publicized to marshal 
popular and legislative support for restrictions on human experimentation. 
Most of these experiments were indefensible, justifying the call for more 
effective regulation of human experimentation.58 Professor Rothman doc­
uments the resulting reforms, including stringent requirements on informed 
consent,59 limitations on research on children and bans on research in­
volving prisoners. 
He also recognizes that these regulations, born of a fear of sinister 
researchers conducting horrible experiments, have two central weaknesses. 
First, the primary vehicle for enforcing the regulations is the Institutional 
Review Board (IRB), a committee appointed by the institution performing 
the research. Institutions are free to appoint anyone to an IRB, they may 
remove troublesome members from the IRB and a few IRBs are empow­
ered to determine whether the experimenters actually follow the informed 
consent protocols approved by the IRB.60 
As Professor Rothman makes clear, the operative assumption behind 
the reform of rules governing human experimentation is that scientists 
cannot be trusted. 61 Yet, in most cases, persons who distrust scientists are 
not opposed to medical research. The most obvious examples are ACT 
UP62 and other victims advocacy groups who decry current research efforts 
while demanding more research into their ailment. This leads to the second 
problem with these regulations: 
On the balance, however, the procedures to protect human experimentation 
are so firmly entrenched that the central issue now, in view of the AIDS 
crisis, is not how to protect the human subject from the investigator but 
how to ensure that all those who wish to be human subjects have a fair 
S7. ROTHMAN, supra note I, at I S-79. 
S8. One of the worst was the Tuskegee syphilis experiment. This study on the long-term 
consequences of syphilis infection began in 1 932. A large group of black men infected with syphilis 
were followed to determine the natural history of the disease. This was questionable in 1932. It was 
inexcusable in 1946 when penicillin became generally available to treat syphilis. See JAMES H. JONES, 
BAD BLOOD: THE TUSICEOEE SYPHll.IS EXPERIMENT (1981); Pollard v. United States, 69 F.R . D .  646 
(M.D. Ala. 1976). 
59. See Protection of Human Subjects; Informed Consent; Standards for Institutional Review 
Boards for Clinical Investigations, 56 Fed. Reg. 28,02.5 (1991) (to be codified at 21 C . F . R. pt . .5 1 ,  
.56). 
60. ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 2S2. 
61.  RoTHMAN, supra note 1, at 100. 
62. AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power, the advocacy group founded by author Larry Kramer. 
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opportunity to enter a protocol. The nightmare image has s.hifted from 
an unscrupulous researcher taking advantage of a helpless inmate t<;> a 
dying patient desperate to join a drug trial and have a ch��ce at . bfe. The backlash against the IRB is spurred not by researchers 1mp�t1ence 
with bureaucratic delays but by patients w ho want to make the1� own 
calculations of risks and benefits and to decide for themselves, without 
the veto power of the IRB, whether a protocol is wort� entering. Altho�g h  
this reorientation in large measure reflects the gnm fate confrontmg 
persons with AIDS, it also testifies to how effectively the IRBs have 
trained, really tamed, the researcher.63 
"Trained and tamed. "  Precisely correct, but incomplete. In their zeal 
to eliminate horrible experiments, reformers ignored a critical issue: why 
do great scientists do research and what happens if they stop? This is 
critical because of the tension between limiting the prerogatives of scientists 
while trying to encourage medical research. Having been involved in 
medical research and having served on IRBs, I believe that there have 
been profound changes in medical research, but that IRBs have been 
almost irrelevant to this change. 
The best science is driven by a lust for knowledge and the all­
consuming excitement that comes with doing productive research on 
important problems. Where ethicists and lawyers see horrible things being 
done to patients without their informed consent, researchers see a path 
to an important discovery. perhaps the cure to a scourge afflicting millions 
of people. A prime motivation of great scientists is the thrill of solving 
difficult problems and explicating the laws of the universe. 
W hile biocthicists sec the increased protection of human subjects as 
the central change in medical research, the most important change has 
been in funding priorities and grant oversight . IRBs are only a small part 
of the bureaucrat ization of science. In general, reformers of science, 
including biocthicists and lawyers, see science as a commodity. If you 
believe that science is a commodity, then it is reasonable that you can 
direct scientific discoveries by how you allocate grant money. This process 
started with the "war on cancer ."  
The war on cancer dictated that federal research funds be reallocated 
to scientists working on cancer cures. In following the war metaphor, 
money was also shifted into giant research organizations, aping the 
Manhattan Project's  approach to building the atomic bomb. Biomedical 
;dentists had to work on cancer-related projects or lose their funding. 
The directors of large laboratories became increasingly powerful, at the 
expense of individual scientists. As grants became much larger. Congress 
dem�nded increasing oversight of grant funds . Grant applications required 
massive _paperwork that specified in detail what the scientist expected to 
accomplish and how the money would be spent . 
Th� war on cancer failed . Some incremental progress was made, but 
no m�gic bullet was found . While it should have been clear that the grand 
experim ent of checkbook science had failed, i t  became impossible to go 
6.l. RoTHMAN,  111pra no1r I ,  al 2 5 2 .  
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back. Great scientists had been turned into laboratory directors responsible 
for obtaining grants to pay the salaries of tens to hundreds of people. 
Having sold their souls to build research empires, they found they could 
no longer do research.64 They had become full-time fund-raisers. They 
were tamed by the federal regulations on obtaining and spending grant 
money, not by IRBs. 
This taming of the medical research establishment, with all its costs 
in lost creativity and careers ruined by arbitrary changes in federal grant 
priorities, did not greatly decrease unethical research. The reason is simple: 
formal medical research has alway s  been a very small part of medical 
practice. Most medical research, including some of the most abusive, 
masquerades a s  patient care. Treating physicians trying "something new" 
have always posed far greater risks than the most determined medical 
scientists. 
These abuses are greatest for medical and surgical procedures.65 
Paradoxically,  we have created a system where there is little or no 
regulation of unproven or even previously untried procedures. As long as 
physicians performing procedures charge the patient for the procedure 
and call it therapy, they are immune from IRB review and most other 
restrictions on human experimentation.66 
The most extreme result of this immunity from review is that major 
medical industries will develop around unproven treatments. Once such 
treatments are institutionalized, they are almost impossible to dislodge. 
While there have been many examples of treatments adopted without 
proper proof of their efficacy, 67 all pale before the coronary artery bypass 
(CAB) industry. Approximately 15  years elapsed between the introduction 
of CABs and the results of the first controlled clinical trials of their 
efficacy. During this period CABs became a multi-billion dollar a year 
business, and many of the CAB s urgeons became millionaires. 
Perhaps most importantly, this period saw a million or more, mostly 
middle and upper class, white men undergo the procedure. Anyone 
64. The story of Faust's bargain with the devil remains the classic picture of scientific curiosity 
combined with ambition. JOHANN GOETHE, FAUST: A TRAGEDY (C. Thomas ed . ,  1 892). 
6S . "Procedure" is used as a general term for invading the patient's body with various 
instruments. At one time, most procedures were performed by surgeons and involved what is 
traditionally thought of as surgery. Most specialties have developed an armamentarium of invasive 
procedures . These include cardiologists doing angiography and angioplasty, internists doing endoscopy 
and surgical procedures through the endoscope, to gynecologists performing lyposuction . Procedures 
generate a lot of money for a limited amount of patient contact time . An hour spent doing a detailed 
medical history and counseling a patient might only generate a $40-$100 fee, while an hour spent 
performing a procedure can generate a $2000 fee. This is in addition to equal or higher charges by 
the hospital or outpatient surgical center for the equipment and support team. 
66. How can this be? Unlike drugs and medical devices, which must be declared 
safe and effective by the U.S. Food & Drug Administration, the decision to adopt a new 
surgical procedure-whether RK or coronary bypass-is left in the hands of those who 
perform it. "The only effective regulation is after-the-fact malpractice," says George J.  
Annas, professor of health law at Boston University. 
Karen Freifeld, Myopic Haste? (100,000 plus have had new eye surgery), FORBES, May 6, 1985 at 
9S(2). 
67. For an excellent chronicle of medical fads, see CHARLES L. BosK, FORGIVE & REMEMBER: 
MANAOINO MEDICAL FAILURE (1979). 
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challenging the appropriateness of this treatment  would face the wrath of 
both a well-financed medical lobby and these "satisfied customers: " 
Understandably, these patients would be unwilling to confront the reabty 
that they might have undergone unnecessary ,  expensive and dangerous 
surgery. Even today, after many studies have demonstrated that t�e 
procedure is only beneficial in limited circumstances,68 many persons still 
undergo unnecessary CABs. 
While CABs are the biggest success story in the sell-it then test-it 
school of medical progress, the most outrageous attempt to prevent the 
investigation of an unproven procedure was mounted by a group of 
ophthalmologists . These ophthalmologists performed radial keratotomies, 
a procedure where the cornea is sliced to change its optical properties. 
The procedure was developed in the Soviet Union and introduced into 
the U nited States without clinical trials. This is a quick procedure and 
one that, in its height, would net its practition ers about $ 1000 an eye. A 
physician who could recruit enough business c ould do several of these a 
day for all the working days in a year. 
When the National Eye Institute set up a study panel to determine 
if this procedure was safe and effective, the physicians participating in 
the study panels found themselves the target of a lawsuit by the 
ophthalmologists performing the procedure. 69 The complaint alleged that 
the panel members conspired to interfere with the businesses of the 
ophthalmologists performing the procedure. W hat was the interference? 
The panel called the procedure experimental, thus raising a question about 
whether insurers should pay for the procedure. 70 
The use of legal process by a well-financed group to prevent the 
investigation of an unproven treatment is the logical extension of a 
regulatory system that makes it difficult to perform research w hile not 
addressing unethical practices by non-scientist physicians . Ironically, this 
happens because even unethical researchers work in the open. Beecher's  
pioneering article and investigation of unethical research practices was 
only possible because researchers must publish t heir work to survive. This 
makes researchers easy targets for bioethicists and lawyers who fas ten 
onto the horrible facts in printed accounts to shape regulatory policy. In 
contrast , unethical practitioners offering unproven procedures as therapy 
are
. 
carefully shielded from scrutiny by privacy laws developed to protect 
patients . 
VI.  PARENTS v. CHILDREN - BABY DOE AND 
NANCY CRUZAN 
. 
One of the most di fficult problems in bioethics is the conflict of 
rights between family members, in  most cases , rights of  children and their 
68 
· Euamc Braunwald, FJf«ts of coronary-arttry bypass gr<ifting on survival: Implications of lltt ro�do';:ud rnro
.
nary·a".tr.v SUrftry study, 309 NEW ENO. J .  MED. 1 181-84 (1983). 
. 
· : hachar \ 
. .  American Academy of Ophthalmoloay, Inc. ,  870 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1989); \ nt 1< . \l. anna. SM f .  Supp. 674 ( N . D .  Ga. 1983). 
7o . Cohn Norman , Clinical Trial Stirs ltgal Battlts: ltgal Disputt.s in A tlanta and Chicago 0�r Surrtry for ... f.vopio Raist l.uut of How Controvtrsial Surgical T«hniquts Should be Assured 227 SclliS('f I J l 6 ( 1 9115).  ' 
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parents. The context of these conflicts changes throughout t he life cycle: 
starting with abortion; moving through duties to protect the fetus; the 
right to refuse medical care for a severely impaired newborn ; the duty to 
properly care for children; the right of minors to independent medical 
care including abortion; decision on the termination o f  lif esupport for 
children; and, ultimately, the decision to terminate lifesupport for one's 
parents . 
Most bioethicists have tried to resolve these conflicts by appeals to 
autonomy: whoever has the right t o  autonomy wins. This is a circular 
solution , however, because they have not articulated a clear rule that 
establishes who should get autonomy. They are left to resolve inconsis­
tencies through ad hoc decisions and silence . The hardest of these incon­
sistencies is treatment for damaged newborns, where the rights of the 
parents , the newborn and the disabled collide. 
A. The Baby Doe Regulations 
Professor Rothman illustrates this coJiision by his account of the 
political maneuverings leading to the Baby Doe rules. 71 The Baby Doe 
rules72 mandated that severely impaired newborns be given all indicated 
medical . treatment, irrespective o f  parental wishes. The regulations were 
inspired by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 73 which outlaws dis­
crimination against the handicapped . 
Parents of severely impaired newborns told horrifying stories of 
children condemned to lives of hopeless despair. 74 Bioethicists, focusing 
on these horror stories, bitterly opposed the Baby Doe rules for interfering 
with the parents right of self-determination.75 In doing so, however, they 
ignored the message implicit in allowing these parent s  to choose to 
withhold care. 
Allowing parents to withhold care from defective newborns was at 
odds with efforts to protect children from abuse and n eglect and with 
ethical arguments made on behalf of the handicapped that their lives were 
fully as valuable as those of the non-handicapped. Advocacy groups for 
the handicapped raised a very difficult issue: Was it so very wrong for a 
severely disabled person, making the most of his or her abilities, to protest 
when an equally disabled baby is allowed to die because its parents see 
its life as a burden to the child and to themselves? This question has 
gone unanswered, continuing to poison the debate over the rights of the 
disabled versus their parents. 
Outside of the abortion debate ,  the conflict of rights between parents 
and children has been the most bitter of the debates over limiting the 
7 1 .  ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 190-22 1 .  
72. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ SlOl-OS (1984). 
73. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 7(7)(8)(ii)(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(8)(B)(ii)(West 
Supp. 1992)). 
74. ROBERT AND PEGGY STINSON, THE LoNO 0YINO OF BABY ANDREW ( 1983). 
7S. See Stephen A.  Newman, Baby Doe, Congress and the States: Challenging the Federal 
Treatment Standard for Impaired Infants, 1 5  AM. J.L. & MED. 1 (1989). 
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freedom of pregnant women in order to protect their unborn ch�ldr�n. In 
this debate, which archetypically involves a pregnant woman abus1�g Il�egal 
drugs, the ethically approved view is that the pregnant woman s nghts 
completely trump any right of society to prot�ct the fetus .
. 
16 
This is a logical approach if the underlymg agenda is to protect a 
woman's right to chose abortion : if abortion is always assumed to be 
available then it is illogical to restrict the rights of a woman if she can 
always �nd the restrictions by aborting the fetus.77 It is in conflict, 
however with the efforts to protect the child's rights that begin imme­
diately �t the birth of the child, at least with the birth of a perfect child. 
Trying to make the moment of birth a mystical dividing line between 
absolute rights of mother and child is inviting legal disaster. The Supreme 
Court and many legislatures abhor legal asymmetries. If they are con­
fronted with an argument that birth is magic because prior to birth the 
woman has a right to abortion, then they are more likely to limit that 
right of abortion than to accept a system that allows a pregnant crack­
head to injure her baby. 
8 . . The Right to Die 
These conflicts and
. 
the inconsistencies in their resolution by bioeth­
icists become most obvious in the debates over the right to die. No issue 
has preoccupied bioethicists more than the right of a patient to refuse 
medical care, particularly in the face of a terminal illness. Professor 
Rothman presents a concise, if traditional, history of the problem . 78 His 
discussion is centered on the Quinlan case, 79 Cruzan80 not having been 
decided when he completed his manuscript. 
I do not intend to review the right to ref use medical care debate in 
this article. 11  I will focus, instead on two unpleasant points that are 
generally ignored by bioethicists :  1) the hypocrisy in simultaneously viii-
76. J. Gallagher ct al., Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 3 16 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1 1 92-
96 (1987); G . J .  Annas, The Impact of Medical Technology on the Pregnant Woman 's Right to 
Privacy, 13 AM .  J.L. & MED. 21 3-32 (1989); D. Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts 
With Women 's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L .  J .  599-
625 (1986); M.A. Field, Controlling the Woman to Protect the Fetus. , 17 LAW MED. HEALTH CA&E .  
1 14-29 (1989); A.C.L.U. Criminal Prosecutions for Fetal Abuse Increasing at Alarming Rate. 1 
Reprod Rights Update 2 (Sept. 1 ,  1989); Note,  Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against 
the Criminalization of 'Fetal Abuse', 101 HAllv. L. REV. 994 ( 1 988). 
77. This is also an appealing position for physicians, partly because it respects the traditional 
patient's rights, partly because it does not require the physician to get involved in nasty legal disputes 
over the woman's  care. See American Medical Association, AMA Board of Trustees Report - Legal 
lnttrventions During Pregnancy; Court-Ordered Medical Treatments and Legal Penalties for Potentially 
Harmful Behavior by Pregnant Women, 264 JAMA 2663-70 (Helene M. Cole, ed. ,  1990). 
78. RoTHMAN, supra note I, at 222-46. 
79. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U .S. 922 (1976). 
80. Cruzan v.  Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en bane), tiff'd sub nom. Cruzan v. 
Director, Missouri Ocp't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). · 
· 
8 1 .  Stt Edward P. Richards, Making Sense of Cruzan: Implications of the Supreme Court's 
Ritht to Die Decision, S/6 J .  INTENSIVE Cun MED. , at 241-45 ( 1 990); Edward P .  Richards, Ethical 
Considerations in Non-Judicial Termination of Life-Support Decisions, 516 J. INTENSIVE CARE MHD., 
at 193-96 (1990). 
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fying and sentimentalizing the family, depending on the legal issue; and 
2) the economics of death. 
C. Cutting Families to Fit the Conclusions 
The hypocrisy is best illustrated in the contrast between two dissenting 
Supreme Court opinions filed on the same day. The first was in a case 
contesting Ohio's requirement that minors seeking abortion must either 
tell their parents or get the approval of a judge:82 
Sadly, not all children in our country are fortunate enough to be members 
of loving families. For too many young pregnant women, parental 
involvement in this most intimate decision threatens harm, rather than 
promises c omfort. The Court ' s  selective blindness to this stark social 
reality is bewildering and distressing. Lacking the protection that young 
people typically find in their intimate family associations , these minors 
are desperately in need of constitutional protection. The sexually or 
physically abused minor may indeed be "lonely or even terrified," not 
of the abortion procedure, but o f  an abusive family member. The Court's 
placid reference to the "compassionate and mature" advice the minor 
will receive from within the family must seem an unbelievable and cruel 
irony to those children trapped in violent families. 83 
I believe that this is an accurate statement of the situation of some 
minors seeking abortion. Even though many may have supportive parents, 
it is unreasonable for the court to assume that all parents will unselfishly 
put their child's interests first. In contrast, however, is the dissent from 
Cruzan, decided on the same day: 
The majority justifies its position by arguing that, while close family 
members may have a strong feeling about the question , "there is no 
automatic assurance that the view o f  close family members will necessarily 
be the same as the patient's would have been had she been confronted 
with the prospect of her situation while competent . "  I cannot quarrel 
with this o bservation. But it leads only to another question: Is there any 
reason to suppose that a State is more likely to make the choice that the 
patient would have made than someone who knew the patient intimately? 
To ask this is to answer it. As the New Jersey Supreme Court observed: 
"Family members are best qualified to make substituted judgments for 
incompetent patients not only because of their peculiar grasp of the 
patient ' s  approach to life, but also because of their special bonds with 
him or her . . . .  It is . . .  they who treat the patient as a person, rather 
than a symbol of a cause ." The State, in contrast, is a stranger to the 
patient.84 
If this romantic picture of the family were transposed to the Akron 
decision, it would be a persuasive argument for the state's  right to require 
parental notification, if not parental consent. I believe that the dissent in 
Akron is correct, but I do not believe that bioethicists and liberal supreme 
court justices can have it both ways. While some scholars attempt to 
distinguish A kron from Cruzan by stressing that Nancy Cruzan was 
82. Ohio v Akron Cntr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990). 
83. Akron, 1 10 S. Ct. at 2991-92 (citations omitted). 
84. Cruzan, 1 10 S. Ct. at 2877. 
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incompetent, this seems irrelevant to the question of family good will and 
motivation. 85 
VII. The Economics of Death 
As a teacher of medical law,  I find my students least objective about 
the financial aspects of medical care delivery. Even when they believe that 
physicians are motivated only by money, they are unwilling to accept the 
logical consequences of that assumption. So it is with the right-to-die 
controversy. First, it is important to remember that the vast majority of 
right-to-die decisions involve persons over sixty-five who are covered by 
Medicare. Young persons in persistent vegetative states are so rare as to 
have a de minimus impact o n  the medical system. 
In simple terms, prior to 1983 physicians and hospitals made money 
by keeping patients alive. The more machines the patient was connected 
to, the more tests that were ordered, the more days that patient was in 
the hospital, the more money the government paid the physicians and the 
hospital . Putting aside the very real emotional concerns about physicians 
being unwilling to face death, about the technological imperative and all 
the other psychological games associated with pulling the plug on patients,  
it was extremely profitable to keep patients around. 
In 1 983 the game changed. Medicare instituted a prospective payment 
system based on diagnosis related groups (DRGs). Under DRGs, the 
government pays hospitals a fixed amount for each patient, based on that 
patient 's  diagnosis. For example, the government might pay the hospital 
S l0,000 to care for a patient with pneumonia. The hospital would receive 
the same amount of money , irrespective of the patient's hospital course. 
If the patient had a simple, uncomplicated recovery, he or she might be 
discharged in a few days, with a net profit to the hospital. On the other 
hand , if the patient developed severe complications and was in the hospital 
for 3 weeks, the hospital would still receive only $ 10,000. In this case, 
the hospital would lose money. 
DR Gs turned medical finance on its head . 86 Suddenly physicians who 
had been the darlings of the hospital because of their lengthy hospitali­
zations and profligate ordering o f  tests became menaces to the hospital's 
bottom line." Physicians were suddenly under pressure to provide less 
care and to get the patients out of the hospital faster.88 It was not lost 
on hospital administrators that if a patient ref uses care and dies on day 
. 85 .  What if the state .
allowed the parents of an incompetent pregnant minor (perhaps injured in an auto acc1den1) to decide whether the minor could be aborted while she slept? 
86. K . E .  Powerly & E. Smith, The Impact of DRGs on Health Care Workers and their Clients, 19  HUTINOS CENTEl REP. 1 6  ( 1 989). 
87 : .It comes as a shock to many law students that hospitals maintain elaborate records of the profi1ab 1l11y of each physician on their medical staffs. 
88 · Th
.
e c�rrcnt law ass�gns the 
.
liability for premature discharge to the physician. Irrespective or the hospttal s threats, which can include termination of medi'cal staff · ·1 th h 
· · . . pnv1 eges, e p ys1c1an cannot
. 
plea
.
d duress in a mc<11cal malpractice lawsuit based on a premature discharge. See Wickline 
v .  Cahfornta'
. 
�28
. 
Cal . Rptr. 661 (2nd Dist . 1 986). See also Thomas H. Boyd, Cost Containment and th«- Ph_l'SIC'lan s F1duc1ary Duty to th«' Patient, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 3 1  ( 1 989). 
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two, the hospital makes even more money than if the patient has a quick 
recovery. 
In my work with legal issues in critical care medicine, most of the 
physicians I encounter are faced with pressures to deny appropriate care 
much more frequently than they see disputes on the right-to-die. I find it 
interesting that there has been almost no discussion in the ethics literature 
of the benefit to the government and other insurers in frightening the 
elderly and the infirm into refusing care. 89 Many who criticize physicians 
as too ready to compromise their patients' interests for money seem ready 
to assume that this motivation somehow does not apply to right-to-die 
decisions. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
In his epilogue, Professor Rothman asks whether bioethics is unduly 
focused on the rights of individua ls, without proper concern for the good 
of society in general. While a def ender of individual rights, Professor 
Rothman points out that they do have a cost. 
I propose that, on balance, p atients' real gains from the involvement 
of outsiders in medical decision-making have been more than offset by 
the losses in autonomy due to managed care and other changes in medical 
care finance. Moreover, outsiders have exacerbated this loss of patient 
autonomy b y  decrying the motives and sincerity of those physicians who 
have tried to act as advocates f o r  their patients' rights. 
Ethicists and lawyers must be more sensitive to the unintended 
consequences of their rules. This is  especially important as private health 
insurers and the government attempt to reduce the cost of medical care. 
It is much more important to protect the rights of all patients to quality 
care than to focus on horrible facts that have little significance in routine 
medical practice. 
89. For a refreshingly contrary view, see Nat Hentoff, Deciding Who Dies, THE WASHINGTON 
Posr, Oct. 26, 1 99 1 ,  at A21 ; Nat Hentoff, When a Hospital Goes to Court to End a Life, THE 
WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 28, 1991, at A27; Nat Hentoff, Who Really Won the Cruzan Decision?, 
THE WASHINGTON POST, July 14, 1990, at A l 9; Nat Hentoff, The Quality of Life - and Death, 
THE WASHINGTON Posr, March 17, 1990, at A29; Nat Hentoff, Two Cheers for the ACLU, THE 
WASHINGTON PosT, March 3, 1990, at A25; Nat Hentoff, Right to Die? Isn 't It Really About the 
Right to Live?, THE WASHINGTON PosT, Nov. 25, 1989, at A23; Nat Hentoff, Not a 'Hopeless Case ' 
After All, THE WASHINGTON PosT, April 29, 1989, at A25; Nat Hentoff, Let Her Die? Or Make Her 
Die?, THE WASHINGTON Posr, Dec. 3 1 ,  1988, at A l9; Nat Hentoff, Euthanasia: Another Warning 
From the Surgeon General, THE WASHINGTON Posr, April I I ,  1987, at A21 .  
